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Abstract
A regime shift towards increased inflation expectations is credited with jump-
starting the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States. Germany
experienced a recovery as fast and strong in the 1930s. What role did inflation
expectations play at the start of this remarkable economic upturn? To answer this
question, we study inflation expectations in Germany across two different methods:
we conduct a narrative study of media sources and estimate inflation expectations
from a FAVAR model. Consistently across these approaches, we do not find a
shift to increased expected inflation. This recovery was different, and its causes lie
elsewhere.
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1 Introduction
Inflation expectations play a central role in explanations for the recovery from the Great
Depression in the United States. Central bankers frequently refer to the historical prece-
dent for this policy prescription: President Roosevelt’s credible commitment to inflate
the economy in the Spring of 1933, which is regarded as a regime change that marks the
beginning of the successful recovery of the U.S. economy (e.g. Eggertsson (2008)).1
Figure 1 shows that Germany experienced a recovery that started in 1932 (Buchheim,
2008) and was as strong and fast as the recovery in the United States. At the same time,
prices continued falling before 1933 (see Figure 2). In this paper, we investigate the role
that inflation expectations played in the German recovery.
To address this question, we study inflation expectations across two methods. First,
following Jalil and Rua (2016), we conduct a narrative identification of inflation expecta-
tions using media articles. Second, we estimate a factor-augmented vector autoregression
(FAVAR) model from 1925 to 1935. Using an extensive dataset of monthly time series,
we conduct one-month, six-month and twelve-month ahead forecasts of inflation rates.
Narrative evidence is helpful for a number of reasons and has been collected for the
Great Depression in the United States, among others, by Jalil and Rua (2016), Nelson
(1989) and Romer and Romer (2013). While quantitative inflation forecasts may depend
on the specific method, and the choice of variables or parameters, narrative sources
can verify and explain their outcomes. Quantitative forecasting methods usually have
a backward-looking perspective, whereas narrative sources may incorporate ideas and
considerations at any point in time that may be independent of reflections on the past.
For this reason, they detect a regime shift that time series approaches fail to identify (see
Romer (2013), Sargent (1982), Temin and Wigmore (1990)). Therefore, news sources are
1 Chouliarakis and Gwiazdowski (2016) and Shibamoto and Shizume (2014) show that inflation
expectations also played a pivotal role in Great Britain and Japan escaping the Great Depression,
respectively.
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Figure 1: Industrial production in Germany and the United States 1925 to 1935












Notes: Industrial production in Germany and the United States, monthly, Jan 1925 = 100.
Sources: Wagemann (1935), Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release G.
17, (2013).
capable of identifying what was known to the general public and which information could
be considered relevant for changes in inflation expectations and, moreover, could point
to the actual sources of such shifts. This is important, because a shift towards inflation
expectations should not be a purely statistical outcome, but it should be experienced by
contemporaries as the result of an abrupt policy change, an event or a shock in order to
be identified as a regime change (Jalil and Rua, 2016).
The second approach is based on direct time series forecasts using a FAVAR model.
Factor models have by now gained considerable popularity for forecasting economic time
series. Boivin and Ng (2005) and Eickmeier and Ziegler (2008) evaluated different fore-
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Figure 2: Prices in Germany and the United States 1925 to 1935














Notes: Monthly prices of industrial finished goods in Germany and U.S. index of wholesale
prices of finished products, 1925 = 100. Sources: Wagemann (1935), NBER Macrohistory
database (1997).
casting methods and found that factor-based forecasts perform well in practice, and
additionally tended to perform better compared to simpler small scaled models. There-
fore, a factor model is a natural candidate for our question at hand. A key advantage
of factor models is that they allow us to incorporate a large amount of information into
the analysis while at the same time keeping the estimation procedure tractable. Fur-
thermore, since factor models are estimated based on the comovement between the time
series in the dataset, a significant expansionary shift visible in a large number of time
series would be picked up by the factors, and this should be informative about future
inflation rates if the underlying cause of such an expansionary shift were due to changes
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in expected inflation rates.
We also considered other approaches to estimate inflation expectations in a historical
context (for an overview see Binder (2016)). One prominent method to estimate inflation
expectations, which uses the Fisher equation that relates expected real interest rates to
nominal interest rates and expected inflation, was first proposed by Mishkin (1981). He
showed that rational expectations imply that inflation expectations can be inferred from
realized real interest rates. For the Great Depression in the United States, Cecchetti
(1992) applies this approach and finds a shift in inflation expectations in 1933 at the
beginning of the recovery, at the same time that Temin and Wigmore (1990) detected a
regime change towards a more expansionary macroeconomic policy. For Germany, Voth
(1999) applied the Mishkin method during the interwar period and detected inflation
uncertainty and fears of inflation in 1931 and 1932, but his results did not point toward
a shift in inflation expectations. One potential problem with German interwar financial
market data is that the nominal rate or bond yield series are very likely not to be risk free.
This makes it difficult to disentangle expected inflation from risk or liquidity premia,
a point that Voth similarly recognized in his work.2 Although we do not pursue this
approach in this paper, we do provide replicated results from Voth (1999) in Appendix
A.1.
Our central finding is that there was no shift in inflation expectations in Germany
at the start of the recovery from the Great Depression in 1932. The narrative study
identifies temporary fears of inflation on a number of occasions that can explain increases
in expected inflation according to our estimates. Newspaper articles reveal no regime
shift towards inflation expectations at any point in time. Starting with the British exit
from the gold standard in September 1931, German newspapers regularly mentioned
2 Another reason for a likely distortion was that interest rates and many prices at the time were
controlled by effective cartels and government regulations. We thank Carsten Burhop, Werner Plumpe,
Mark Spoerer and Jochen Streb for this very important indication.
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currency devaluation and inflationary policies as viable policy options. Fears of inflation
appeared during discussions about an extensive expansionary policy in January 1932,
after the formation of the Papen government in June 1932 and as a reaction to Hitler’s
seizure of power in 1933. However, according to the news account, none of the events
caused an enduring change in inflation expectations. Each time inflation came into the
minds of the general public, the government and Reichsbank were eager to rule out any
price-increasing policies. This finding is in line with what Straumann (2009) argues was
the case for several European countries at the time.
The forecasts from the FAVAR model also show no indication of a sudden regime
shift in inflation expectations that would be comparable to the U.S. experience. While
the time series forecasts reveal positive expected inflation rates during the summer of
1932, consistent with the narrative evidence these expectations did not last. This result
holds across all forecast horizons. In sum, across both approaches we find that inflation
expectations were not the cause of the remarkable recovery from the Great Depression
in Germany, and the answer to this question must be sought elsewhere.3
2 Narrative Account
To discover a possible shift in inflation expectations in Germany at the start of the recov-
ery from the Great Depression, we follow Jalil and Rua (2016) and first provide a general
overview of newspaper coverage about inflation through a word search of newspaper ar-
ticles. We then conduct a detailed narrative study of media sources over a two-year
period.
3 This result is backed by what Cohen-Setton, Hausmann, and Wieland (2017) argue for the case of
France, where extensive supply-side policies in 1936 induced a remarkable inflation that by no account
could be regarded as the key factor in ending the Depression in France. For possible explanations
regarding the German recovery see, for example, Spoerer and Streb (2013).
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2.1 General overview of inflationary news coverage 1930 to
1933
To detect media coverage on possible inflation expectations, we study Vossische Zeitung,
one of Germany’s national newspapers of record during the Weimar Republic. Vossische
Zeitung had a daily circulation of approximately 68,000 in 1931, and it covered the
main events and debates of the time (Binkowski and Schottenloher (1985), Institut für
Zeitungskunde (1932)).
In the on-line database provided by the De Gruyter publishing house, we searched
all issues of the newspaper from 1930 to 1933 and counted the number of articles that
contained the German terms for ‘inflation’. Specifically, we used a combination of the
terms, word stems and abbreviations of the German words ‘Inflation’ (inflation) and
‘Teuerung’ (dearness).4 If there were a sudden shift in inflation expectations, there
should have been an increased public interest likely reflected in more articles about
inflation in one of the leading newspapers at the time.
We depict the resulting series in Figure 3. Before summer 1931, fewer than 30 articles
per month on average mentioned inflation; in September and October, the mentioning
of inflationary terms increased threefold to a total number of 86 articles. This signifies
more than two articles per day on average. After fall 1931, inflation coverage occurred to
a lesser extent in Vossische Zeitung, although appearances remained at a higher average
than before, with some months clearly above the number of articles per month before
fall 1931. This was the case for November 1931 as well as for January and June 1932. In
1933, inflation coverage was lower but still had spikes above average in January, April,
June and August. Accordingly, in Figure 3, we identify four spikes (or periods of spikes)
of increased inflation mentions – Fall 1931, January 1932, June 1932, January to August
4 We also considered terms like ‘Geldentwertung’ (debasement), ‘Preissteigerung’ (price increase),
‘Preisanhebung’ (price lift), ‘Preiserhöhung’ (price rise), and ‘Preisheraufsetzung’ (price raise, markup).
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1933 – that could point to a shift in inflation expectations in the news and which we
discuss separately in greater detail below.
Figure 3: Inflation mentions in Vossische Zeitung 1930-1934
Notes: The monthly frequency of articles that contain terms related to inflation in Vossische
Zeitung. We also indicate prevalent topics in the news in four periods of increased news
coverage.
To investigate whether any of these spikes corresponded to an inflationary shock, we
checked all articles containing inflation during the four mentioned time periods. Table
1 indicates the events or topics that went along with inflationary words ordered chrono-
logically by the four spikes and months of occurrence. In each month, we examined
the context in which inflationary terms occurred by reading the relevant articles. We
classified articles with reference to a specific current event as dealing with such event.
In many cases, inflation was exclusively mentioned in reference to the hyperinflation of
1923 with no relation to the present. In that case, we classified it as ”Hyperinflation in
retrospect”. If an article compared actual events to past periods we classified the article
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as referring to an actual event. Articles not counted as part of either an actual event or
the hyperinflation of 1923 referred to a wide range of topics from literature, culture and
sports and were of no relevance to our research question.
Table 1: Months and events with increased inflation mentions in Vossische Zeitung
Spike Month # Articles Event/Topic 1 Event/Topic 2
1 September 1931 67 Hyperinflation in retrospect British exit from gold
(24) (19)
October 1931 86 Germany’s economic policy British exit from gold debate
(37) (20)
November 1931 62 Exit from gold policy debate Hyperinflation in retrospect
(24) (19)
2 January 1932 59 Hyperinflation in retrospect Exit from gold policy debate
(30) (15, in part Wagemann’s Plan)
3 June 1932 56 Papen government Hyperinflation in retrospect
(21) (17)
4 January 1933 53 Inflation debate globally Hyperinflation in retrospect
(24, in part Hitler) (19)
April 1933 48 Inflation debate U.S Hyperinflation in retrospect
(36) (9)
June 1933 50 Inflation debate U.S Hyperinflation in retrospect
(20) (18)
August 1933 50 Inflation debate globally Hyperinflation in retrospect
(20) (18)
Notes: The first column indicates the assignment of each month to one of the four spikes
indicated in Figure 3. Columns 2 and 3 indicate the selected months and the number of articles
per month that mention inflation. The last two columns show the two main events/topics
involving inflation. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of articles per topic, and in some
cases a certain aspect of the event or debate.
Table 1 lists chronologically the months with a large number of articles about inflation
(column 2), the classification to one of the four spikes (column 1), the number of articles
including inflation (column 3) as well as the two topics - or events - related to inflation
with the most mentions (columns 4 and 5). In columns 4 and 5, we further indicate in
brackets the number of articles that we related to the two topics. These two inflationary
topics or events were prevalent in the vast majority of articles mentioning inflation in
the designated months. More than two-thirds of the articles in our sample each month
referred to these two subjects. Apart from mentions of the hyperinflation of 1923, we
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find references to at least one actual political event or debate in each month. We also
indicated such relevant events for each spike in Figure 3.
In September 1931, inflationary news predominantly covered the British exit from
the gold standard and related this event to expected inflationary tendencies in Britain.
In the following months the discussion about Britain remained prominently in the news
at least until January 1932 as indicated by the topics in Table 1. As one consequence of
the British exit from the gold standard, the news account in Vossische Zeitung reveals
that after fall 1931, inflationary policies and a devaluation of the Reichsmark were also
discussed in Germany. German economic conditions were regularly compared to the
situation in other countries, such as Britain, but also to Germany’s own experience with
hyperinflation. Importantly, the news account also shows that such considerations were
regularly opposed by the German government and central bank.
In January 1932, at a time of ongoing inflationary debates in Britain and the United
States, a plan for a more expansionary economic policy proposed by the head of the
statistical office, Ernst Wagemann received some media attention. In June 1932, the new
Papen government was allegedly expected to conduct inflationary policies. In January
1933, this was the case when Hitler seized power. Inflationary policies in the United
States were in the focus of the now controlled media for the remainder of 1933. The
word counts visualized in Figure 3 are therefore remarkably in line with Borchardt’s 1985
notion that fears of inflation prevailed after political events associated with currency
devaluation, credit expansion or expected government deficits.
10
2.2 A detailed narrative study of media sources September
1931 to August 1933
We next investigate chronologically the relevant political events and debates with respect
to a possible shift to inflation expectations by a careful narrative study of media sources.
For this study, we read weekly issues of the economic periodical ‘Der Deutsche Volkswirt’
(DDV) over a two-year period from September 1931 to August 1933. DDV had the
advantage of a weekly frequency that permitted a careful reading of articles over a
prolonged time period. We divided our analysis by the spikes in the news coverage as
shown in the previous section; however, we carefully included potentially inflationary
events during other periods. As one of the leading and influential periodicals in its field
at the time (Röpke, 1933), DDV had a weekly subscription of up to 6,000 and provided
a weekly summary of political events and the state of the economy (Sattler, 1982).
At relevant dates we considered two major daily newspapers: ‘Vossische Zeitung’
(VZ) and ‘Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger’ (LA). We read both papers one week before and
after such dates in order to observe immediate reactions but also to identify diverging
opinions about the events. While both DDV and VZ could be considered economically
liberal and politically centrist, with a daily circulation of approximately 200,000 in 1932
LA leaned to the nationalist conservatives. While VZ and DDV were backing Brüning
and later Schleichers economic policies, LA stood unconfined with the German National
People’s Party (DNVP), their leader Alfred Hugenberg and later the Hitler government.
As a form of robustness check, we considered further news sources that spanned the entire
political spectrum as well as the scientific publications of the Institute for Business Cycle
Research.5
5 We provide an overview of the articles cited here in an online Appendix.
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2.2.1 September to December 1931 - Britain’s exit from gold and inflation
debates in Reichstag
The first potentially inflationary situation occurred in September 1931. After Britain left
the gold standard on September 21, on several occasions the German government and
Reichsbank announced that they were ’not considering devaluing the Reichsmark for the
possible loss of currency stability and inflationary consequences’ (VZ 25-30.09.31). DDV
argued that Britain’s decision to leave gold was supposedly driven by Keynes’ instruction
as a means against deflation and warned that similar measures in Germany could cause
inflation due to its experience with hyperinflation in 1923. It mentioned that fears of
inflation were already apparent. DDV further accused the right-wing press of exploiting
this situation by calling for more autarky, to leave the gold standard and instead to
establish an unconvertible ‘interior currency’ in Germany (DDV 25.09.31). This claim
was not far flung when considering news coverage about the party convention of the
DNVP on the weekend before Britain’s exit from gold. At the meeting, Alfred Hugenberg
had called for a disencumbering of the indebted industry and agriculture, the break of
international treaties, and the turning away from international currency agreements such
as the gold standard. Hugenberg also identified deflation as a major problem for the
German economy at this point of the crisis (LA 20.09.31, see also the social democratic
Vorwärts on 19.09.31). General industry interest groups, in contrast, publicly opposed
currency experiments but endorsed a public credit expansion (VZ 30.09.31).
Two weeks later, the political right announced a vote of no-confidence against the
Brüning government for the following parliamentary debates (VZ 12.10.31). For the
remainder of the parliamentary week, inflation became a persistent issue during the
important speeches. Speakers from the moderate left to the center-right defended the
government for their policy of economic stability while denouncing the nationalists for al-
legedly turning Germany into inflationary chaos should their no-confidence vote succeed.
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On October 16 – the day of the vote – DDV declared that the fall of the government
as threatened by the ‘right-wing-opposition, raised fears of another inflation’. In the
same issue, DDV even mentioned ‘panic buying and a retention of the sellers’. VZ had
noticed surging stock markets already three days earlier (VZ 13.10.31) and had remarked
that a ‘government of currency stability’ was at stake being confronted by a ‘block of
inflationists’ (VZ 14/15.10.31).
After Brüning’s victory in the confidence vote, DDV (23.10.31) summarized the dra-
matic events of the preceding week as ‘commotion of mistrust in the banks and towards
the stability of the currency’. It recognized an increase in acquirements and an expan-
sion of retail sales as a consequence of the panic buying in the preceding week (DDV
30.10.31). In November, news regarding inflation abated (DDV 06.11.31), and no ‘in-
flationary events’ appeared in the media. Possible inflationary tendencies in England
and other countries that had left the gold standard were frequently discussed (e.g., VZ
01.11.31), while potential currency experiments in Germany were regularly opposed by
politicians and interest groups (VZ 06-10.11.31, 24.11.31, 28.11.31).
One consequence of the currency devaluations in other countries was that economic
discussions in Germany shifted to a decrease of prices and wages as a means to keep
Germany’s competitiveness on world markets, which basically constituted the opposite
of inflation expectations. The result was the presidential decree of December 8, which
forcibly cut prices, rents, wages and interest rates as of January 1, 1932 (DDV 27.11.31-
18.12.31).6 First price reductions as a reaction to the decree came within a few days (VZ
18.12.31). During the debate about the decree and in the following weeks, news coverage
revealed no indication of a potential increase in prices in the future as a consequence of
the drastic cut in the present.
In sum, the spike in the media coverage about the British exit from gold and discus-
6 We provide a detailed description of the presidential decree in Appendix A.2.
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sions about inflation in fall 1931 constitute no regime shift towards inflation expectations.
Likewise, we do not detect a change toward expansionary policies at this point in time.
2.2.2 January to May 1932 - Expansionary policies are ruled out
In January 1932, Ernst Wagemann, head of the Institute for Business Cycle Research and
president of the statistical office of the Reich, published a plan to counter the depression
in Germany. The proposal comprised work programs financed by a moderate credit
expansion, taking into account mild inflation (DDV 22.01.32, VZ 20.01.32, LA 20.01.32,
see also Wagemann (1932)). While some observers pointed out positive examples from
other countries and the industry leaning press hoped for a ‘reflation of the devalued
economy’, DDV - and as it argued ‘all experts’ - declined Wagemann’s idea as either too
small and therefore useless or devastatingly inflationary: A credit expansion necessary
for an effective work program would result in inflation because of Germany’s experience
in 1923 (DDV 29.01.32-19.02.32).
Under the impression of this continuing discussion, the German government an-
nounced on January 30 that it was under no circumstances considering currency ex-
periments or a change of the Reichsbank law (VZ 30.01.32). Following this virtual
refusal of the Wagemann plan, no news appeared thereafter that pointed to inflationary
fears or concrete expansionary policies, and therefore no permanent shift in inflation
expectations.
Further public work programs were frequently discussed in the following months and
drew support from the agricultural and industrial interest groups, some banks and trade
unions (DDV 19.02.32, VZ 30.01.32). Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers Party
(NSDAP) put credit financed work programs into their party manifesto, and its electoral
success may in part be attributed to this unique feature. What all proponents of work
programs had in common was that they stressed that their plans were too small to be
14
inflationary (see VZ 14.04.32, also Borchardt (1985)).
2.2.3 June to December 1932 - The Papen government
After Brüning’s centrist minority government came to an end on May 30, stock markets
rose and bond prices fell, cash withdrawals and increased property acquisitions were
reported (DDV 03.06.32, VZ 01-03.06.32). VZ noted that ‘certain circles advocating
currency experiments observed their time coming while scared capitalists engaged in
stocks as a safeguard’. DDV interpreted the situation that ‘under the prospect of the
next, more right-wing government, the general public takes flight into real assets’ and
concluded: ‘The events of the last days are object teaching how credit expansion and
currency experiments in Germany would take effect. We only hope, the next government
will understand’ (DDV 03.06.32). LA took a different stance. It suspected ‘certain
circles’ of engaging in the stock market in order to ‘stage a flight into real assets’. At
the same time, ‘the left-wing press gave the impression that new inflation was about to
come’. Both were intended to ‘increase nervousness’, ‘panic’ and a ‘catastrophe mood’
in Germany (LA 01.06.32). Regardless of whether LA was right, the media coverage
about the danger of inflationary tendencies certainly induced or reflected fears among
parts of the public.
When it was announced that Franz von Papen would form the next government (LA
01.06.32), the ‘dark nightmares’ of inflationary measures suddenly appeared possible
(DDV 03.06.32). The new chancellor appeared willing to form a majority in Reichstag
with Hugenberg’s nationalists potentially even backed by Hitler’s inflationary national
socialists. The media speculated that Reichsbank president Luther could resign for his
diverging views on stable economic policies (VZ 02.06.32, see also Vorwärts 02.06.32).
After his appointment, however, Papen immediately met with the central bank pres-
ident making clear that Luther would stay in office, and they both publicly declared
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that ‘any currency or credit experiments, that could possibly endanger the value of the
currency were out of question’ (VZ 03.06.32). This action seems to have been enough
to stop the flight into real assets, and stock markets calmed down (VZ 04.06.32, LA
04.06.32). DDV noted that the ‘severe psychosis had faded after the new government
left no doubt about currency stability’ (DDV 10.06.32). In the following weeks, no in-
dications of lasting fears of inflation or expected price increases appeared in the news
account.
In July 1932, the Lausanne Conference reached an agreement, which for Germany
would mean a cut in reparations by 90 percent and hence new financial scope for action
to fight the depression. DDV stated that the quasi-end of reparations as negotiated in
Lausanne would provide the conditions for an economic upturn in Germany. At the same
time, it curiously noted that many observers (especially from the right-wing press) did
not praise this remarkable success (DDV 15.07.32, also VZ 09.07.32). The agreement
implied a gain in sovereignty: implementing Lausanne would mean the end of interna-
tional supervision of the Reichsbank as under the Young Plan and room to maneuver in
monetary policy, a point that Hans Luther was quite pessimistic about. The president
of the Reichsbank warned that Germany should by no means start conducting autarky
policies and devalue from gold as a consequence of the new gained freedom since such
measures could lead to high rates of inflation (VZ 09.07.32). After the agreement, bond
markets grew, possibly expecting quick discount rate cuts or a change of the Reichsbank
law (VZ 09.07.32); however, no news pointed toward expected inflation in the following
weeks.
In late August 1932, under the impression of growing political violence and two elec-
tion campaigns, chancellor Papen was willing to use the newly gained financial scope
and announced an expansionary economic program. While work programs had been
discussed in the preceding months, DDV noted that the ‘timing and announcement of
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the Papen program was psychologically quite effective’ and that market participants
were apparently surprised by its dimension (DDV 02.09.32, VZ 29.08.32). The plan
comprised moderate sized work programs, tax reductions for hiring and subsidies for
building repairs. It was financed by central bank loans and wage reductions. In addi-
tion, the Reichsbank would reduce the discount rate (DDV 09.09.32). Positive sentiment
continued over the course of the next weeks as more details emerged, and the govern-
ment underscored that it would refrain from currency experiments (DDV 09.09.32, VZ
26.08.32, 27.08.32). The Reichsbank had already declared earlier that it was funding
projects only if no inflationary policies were implemented (VZ 24.08.32).
Although apparently in part intended to fight deflation (it was at least mentioned
once: VZ on 28.08.32), the media did not expect inflationary tendencies of the measures.
The social democratic newspaper Vorwärts noted that the Reichsbank’s involvement in
the program would not necessarily mean that inflationary consequences were ruled out.
It also highlighted the strong stock market surges; however, it did not link them to
fears of inflation: ‘stocks of firms that would possibly benefit most from wage reductions
proposed by the program gained most’ (Vorwärts 30.08.1932). Hence, if the program had
positive effects on the economy, contemporary observers did not expect them through
inflation but rather through wage reductions, a rather small credit expansion, subsidies
and incentives (DDV 21.10.32).
The narrative evidence, therefore, provides no indications for a lasting shift to in-
flation expectations as a result of this program. The central bank had made it clear
from the beginning that it would not accept and support inflationary policies. Even
though the stock market boom could have involved some inflationary considerations, the
media did not provide such an interpretation. In December 1932, under the short-lived
Schleicher government, further work programs showed a comparable reaction without
expected price increases mentioned in the media.
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2.2.4 January to August 1933 - The Hitler government and U.S. inflation
Hitler’s seizure of power on January 30, 1933 came as a shock to a large part of the Ger-
man public – politically and economically. The NSDAP had favored a costly large-scale
extension of work programs. In contrast to other politicians, to reach their goals, na-
tional socialist speakers appeared willing and aggressive enough to use drastic measures:
autarky, currency devaluation, a large budget deficit and the violation of international
treaties.
As a possible consequence, DDV reported a dramatic fall in bond prices and increases
in stock prices allegedly motivated by fears of inflation: ‘The economy is paralyzed again
by uncertainty about what will come, despite assertions that economic and currency ex-
periments would be ruled out’ (DDV 02.02.33). VZ, however, observed relatively calm
stock markets and interpreted them as a reaction to the new government’s and Reichs-
bank’s rejection of ‘currency and economic experiments’ (VZ 31.01.33). LA interpreted
the increases on stock markets as positive sign of fading uncertainty under the new
government (LA 30-31.01.33).
After the shock of the first days, possible fears of currency experiments were no longer
mentioned in the media. On the one hand, the government repeatedly announced that it
had no such plans and stressed the ‘importance of absolute security for the well-being of
the German people and the economy’. On the other hand, pressure on the free press in-
tensified and economic opinion articles occurred less frequently (some exceptions: DDV
10.02.33, 24.02.33, VZ 02-04.02.33). In one of those articles, Hans Luther, president of
the Reichsbank, warned in February that the fall of the international constraints under
the Lausanne treaty could be exploited to put the central bank under political influence
with unpredictable consequences for financial stability (DDV 24.02.33). VZ discussed the
possibility that as part of the consolidation of powers under the new government (Gle-
ichschaltung), the Reichsbank might be the next institution to become disempowered
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and highlighted Luther’s achievement of currency stability (VZ 10.03.33). Nevertheless,
Luther’s resignation a week later was not being debated critically. VZ (17.03.33) and
other newspapers printed Luther’s open farewell letter, in which he mentioned his re-
lentless stance for central bank independence but also underlined that Hitler himself had
assured him that no currency experiments were planned. His successor, Hjalmar Schacht,
declared currency stability a central objective of the Reichsbank (see VZ 07.04.33) and
continued to pursue an orthodox policy (James, 1993).
Despite possible expectations of drastic policy changes under a Hitler government
beforehand, we find no shift to inflationary policies or expected inflation in the first
months of the new government. The Hitler dictatorship clearly did not conduct an openly
inflationary policy. In fact, Hitler himself opposed inflationary policies and regarded the
power of the state (in the shape of SA and concentration camps) as a decisive safeguard
against it (James, 1986). In a unique example of this power, on May 16, the Munich
police accused 200 small businessmen of raising prices and detained them in the Dachau
concentration camp. The incident was made public as a cautionary tale, and the public
was requested to give notice of imitators (VZ 21/22.05.33, also Völkischer Beobachter
20.05.1933; see Domröse (1974)).7 One factor demonstrating the resoluteness of the
regime in terms of price increases may be due to the implementation of a general freeze
on pay increases shortly beforehand. The freezing of wages in itself meant that price
increases became less likely in the short and medium term and made such activities even
more unpopular among the working population.
Between April and August, the news coverage mentioning inflation focused mainly
on the United States, where president Roosevelt pursued a shift to inflation expectations
in April (VZ 19-22.04.33), and in June, the world economic conference in London put
the currency discussion on a global level (DDV 28.04.33, 05.05.33, 02.06.33, 16.06.33,
7 We thank Harold James for emphasizing this important incident.
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23.06.33, 30.06.33, 14.07.33, 04.08.33). In Germany, no policy measures were imple-
mented with the expressed intention of raising price levels, while the government and
Reichsbank repeatedly ruled out inflationary policies (VZ 07.04.33, 02.06.33, 10.08.33,
26.08.33, DDV 18.04.33). The few incidents in which government intervention resulted
in increased prices of particular goods were carefully discussed and the scope of such
increases was restricted. This was, for instance, the case for minimum prices on animal
fats to support suffering farmers and a revision of the cartel law (VZ 22.05.33, 23.05.33,
15.07.33, 18.07.33, 29.08.33). In sum, we find no regime shift to inflation expectations
under the Nazi government at the start of the recovery even when considering a later
starting date of the recovery in 1933.8,9
3 Time series evidence
In this section, we employ a factor model to estimate inflation expectations. Factor
models have gained considerable popularity for forecasting economic time series. Boivin
and Ng (2005) evaluated different forecasting methods and found that for prices and
one month forecast horizons, factor-based forecasts performed better than simple AR(1)
forecasts. Eickmeier and Ziegler (2008) also show that factor models perform very well
compared to simpler benchmark models or small scaled models. Therefore, a factor
model is a natural candidate for our question at hand.
We start by presenting the structure of the model and the dataset used for estimation.
8 A later start of the recovery during the early stages of the Hitler dictatorship has been suggested,
for instance, by Overy (1996) and Abelshauser (1999).
9 As a result of the likely bias of the media account due to suppression and government control, we
verified that there were no inflation expectations in the first months of the Third Reich by examining
further sources: the briefings to the press of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
(Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda), and the reports of the secret state police
(Gestapo) both for the year 1933, available in the German federal archives (Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde) and the Prussian Privy State Archives of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation
(Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin). We thank Mark Spoerer for emphasizing
this point.
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Afterwards, we present our estimation results.
3.1 The empirical model
The factor model we use relates a large number of time series Y to a small number of
common but unobserved factors f . The dynamics of these factors are described by a
VAR process. Formally, the model is given by
Yt = Λft + et (1)
ft = B1ft−1 + · · ·+BLft−L + vt (2)
et ∼ N (0,Ω), vt ∼ N (0,Σ) (3)
In Equation (1) Yt is a 109 × 1 vector of observed variables, ft is a 3 × 1 vector of
common latent factors10, Λ is the corresponding 109×3 matrix of factor loadings, and et
is a 109×1 vector of idiosyncratic errors. We assume that et and vt are uncorrelated and
that Ω is a diagonal matrix. Equation (2) specifies the dynamics of the factors as a VAR
of order 12, with corresponding 3×3 coefficient matrices Bl. Using 12 months as the lag
order is the most commonly used lag length for monthly VAR models. As in any factor
model, we have to deal with the issue that the common factors and loadings are not
separately identified. We solve this issue following common practice and restricting the
upper 3×3 block of Λ to be the identity matrix. The model is estimated using Bayesian
methods. The specification of the prior distributions for the parameters follows Ritschl
and Sarferaz (2014). We describe the prior distributions and the estimation procedure
in detail in Appendices A.3 and A.4.
With this model, our goal is to produce h-step out-of-sample forecasts of inflation rates,
10 We chose 3 factors because the information criterion suggested by Bai and Ng (2002) determined
this to be the optimal number of factors for the majority of subsamples.
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conditional on information available at some point in time T . This is easily done using
the state-space form of the model in Equations (1) and (2), which implies the following














YT+h|T = ΛfT+h|T + ẽT+h (6)
Equation (4) combines the relevant factor values into a single column vector, according
to the lag length in the factor VAR. Equation (5) then uses the VAR system to produce
a forecast of the factors. The matrix J refers to the matrix that selects the first three
rows of the companion form forecasts of the common factors, and the matrix B is the
companion form coefficient matrix. Lastly, Equation (6) uses the factor forecasts to
produce the h-step ahead forecast of the panel. Note that in Equations (5) and (6)
we add random errors drawn from their respective posterior distributions in order to
accurately reflect the uncertainty associated with the forecasts.
One critical issue with any forecast concerns the appropriate choice of the information
set at any particular point in time. It would be inappropriate to estimate the model over
the entire sample once and base forecasts on these estimates. This is because the Gibbs
sampling algorithm we use estimates the common factors moving backwards through
time, and thus necessarily includes information from future time periods. To avoid this,
we use a recursive forecasting procedure and estimate the econometric model first on a
sample that ends in December 1929. With this sample we produce forecasts of inflation
rates for the following one, six, and twelve months. We subsequently add one month at
a time to the original dataset and estimate the econometric model again. This approach
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ensures that we do not include information into the information set that was actually
not available to agents.
3.2 Data
We use a rich dataset from Wagemann (1935), which consists of 109 time series covering
important time series such as production and employment, various price indexes, trade,
banking and monetary aggregates, and nominal interest rates. The data are of monthly
frequency. All the time series, except for nominal interest rates, were seasonally adjusted
prior to estimation and transformed into 100 times the monthly difference in natural
logarithms of the adjusted series. The nominal interest rate series are divided by 12
to convert them to monthly rather than annual interest rates. The panel with these
definitions then starts in February 1925 and ends in June 1935. A complete list of
the variables used to extract the common factors is provided in Appendix A.5. When
estimating the common factors, we used standardized values of the time series, so that
each series has zero mean and variance 1 for each estimation sample. This is a commonly
used transformation of the data that ensures comparability across time series. When
constructing the forecasts, we convert them back by adding the mean and the standard
deviation of each variable in every run of the sampling procedure to measure inflation
expectations that can be compared to actually realized inflation rates.
A brief note on data transformations is in order. We convert the time series to month-
to-month changes for two reasons. First, from the point of view of forming expectations
about future inflation rates it is much more sensible to assume that what agents keep
track of is the month-to-month change in price levels or aggregate activity, rather than
assuming that the relevant growth rates span an entire year. Second, the underlying
econometric theory is mostly developed for the case of stationary time series, and most
studies that forecast economic time series use period-by-period log differences of the
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variables. Stock and Watson (1999), Stock and Watson (2002b), Stock and Watson
(2002a), Eickmeier and Ziegler (2008) all use transformations of this sort, and we stick
to this common practice in this paper.
3.3 Results
We start by considering one-month-ahead forecasts for two important inflation series,
namely, inflation of industrial finished products and inflation of consumption goods. In
what follows, we report the median of the posterior distributions together with 95 % of
the posterior probability mass. Additionally, actual monthly inflation rates are reported
as a point of reference. As Figure 4 illustrates, the forecasts closely track the actual
monthly inflation series, albeit with a one-month delay. This is to be expected given
the linearity of the forecasting model. We observe two facts about expected inflation.
First, throughout 1930 and 1931 continued deflation was expected each month as the
consistent negative forecasted series show. The large deflation shock of January 1932 also
fueled expectations of further large deflation rates. Given that by this time Germany had
already faced continued deflation rates that were pursued by the German administra-
tion even more strongly in December 1931, there is no reason expectations should have
been any different.11 Second, while the deflation period was to a large extent expected
to continue during the early 1930s, the evidence for expected inflation rates after the
summer of 1932 is mixed. While inflation expectations together with actual inflation
revert back toward lower deflation rates, both inflation and deflation are consistent with
agents’ forecasts from mid-1932 onwards. Actual inflation rates were consistently neg-
ative until the end of 1932 for both series, and the evidence does not support the view
that Germany experienced a similarly clear-cut reversal in inflation expectations as the
United States did.
11 We provide a detailed description of the measures taken in December 1931 in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 4: One-month ahead forecasts
Industrial Finished Products



























Notes: Medians of posterior distribution shown in blue, 95 % of the posterior probability mass
in gray.
We next move toward forecasts over the following six months from each point in
time. The results from this exercise are reported in Figure 5. The two graphs show
for each point in time what expected inflation was six months from that particular
point onwards. For example, the value for January 1931 measures expected inflation for
July 1931 based on information available until January 1931. At first glance the plot
seems to indicate that over longer horizons there was indeed an upward shift in inflation
expectations starting in mid-1932. However, a comparison with expected inflation rates
from the early 1930s shows that this is rather a reversal of expectations that the public
already held, which was only disrupted by the abnormally large deflation period. This
conclusion holds true for both inflation rates considered here, and both series are in fact
very similar.12
As a last check, we have also computed forecasts for an entire year from each point
in time onward; these results for which are shown in Figure 6. The pattern we observed
for six months ahead expected inflation remains until mid-1932. What is striking about
12 We have also estimated forecasts for other price series in the dataset, with very similar results.
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Figure 5: Six-months ahead forecasts
Industrial Finished Products





















Notes: Medians of posterior distribution shown in blue, 95 % of the posterior probability mass
in gray.
Figure 6: Twelve-months ahead forecasts
Industrial Finished Products



















Notes: Medians of posterior distribution shown in blue, 95 % of the posterior probability mass
in gray.
this figure, however, is the clear and quick convergence of expected inflation rates to zero
toward the end of 1932. Essentially, there was nothing known to the public that would
have indicated that positive inflation rates, if they were expected at all, would persist
over time. Clearly, the opposite is the case during the early years of the decade, where
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continued deflation impulses lead inflation expectations to be adjusted downward. This
also suggests that the fact that inflation expectations are essentially zero towards the
end of the sample period was to a large extent not driven by the stationarity assumption
of the VAR model, which implies that over longer horizons the forecasts converge to the
unconditional mean of the factors. If this were the case, we would also see zero expected
inflation at the beginning of the sample.
Overall, the time series evidence shows little evidence of inflation expectations, with
some occasional hint toward positive expected inflation at best. This is not surprising
given that the slight increase in price levels once the economy had passed the economic
trough paled in comparison to the preceding deflation episode.
4 Conclusion
Inflation expectations are regarded as a key factor in the recovery from the Great Depres-
sion in the United States. In Germany, no measures to increase inflation expectations
were feasible given its experience with hyperinflation in 1923. However, Germans ex-
perienced a recovery as fast and as strong as in the U.S. Our article sheds light on the
question of whether this remarkable recovery truly went along without inflation expec-
tations. Or were there really inflation expectations in Germany?
To answer this question, we examined inflation expectations across two methods:
We gathered new narrative evidence from the media account in Germany during the
depression and then estimated inflation expectations using forecasts from an extensive
dataset in a FAVAR model. Our finding is that there were no inflation expectations
at the beginning of the recovery in Germany. Our quantitative forecasting results are
inconclusive. The inflation forecasts show no indication for a clear shift to inflation ex-
pectations at any point between 1931 and 1933. However, we do observe an increase in
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inflation expectations in 1932, a time of ongoing deflation. A detailed narrative study of
media articles ruled out a regime change that was potentially undetected by our quan-
titative estimates. Newspaper article counts with respect to inflation reveal four spikes
in the coverage, which could possibly point to inflationary news. Reading carefully, the
narrative record reveals that whenever fears of inflation came up politicians denounced
any price increasing policies and emphasized the unconditional (price) stability of the
currency.
As Jalil and Rua (2016) have thoroughly traced the causes of the regime shift in the
United States to inflation expectations in spring 1933, our study provides considerable
narrative evidence that no such event occurred in Germany. The story of Temin and
Wigmore (1990) and Eggertsson (2008) may hold for the U.S. For the German recovery,
inflation expectations played no major role.
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A.1 Estimating inflation expectations using the Mishkin-method
Mishkin (1981) estimates inflation expectations from real rate forecasts. Here, we repli-
cate Voth (1999), who applied the method to German data during the interwar period.
Our specification is Voth’s model 2 with the monthly money rate as interest rate, be-
cause this approach uses a dataset that comes close to our own data incorporated in the
FAVAR forecasts.
Following Mishkin (1981), the expected real interest rate between periods t− 1 and
t is determined by the Fisher equation
rt = it − πet (7)
That is, expected real interest rates are determined as the difference between the nominal
interest rate between the periods it and expected inflation π
e
t . A similar relationship holds
for realized real interest rates:
eprrt = it − πt (8)
Mishkin’s approach now supposes that a subset Xt−1 of the available past information
set available to agents at the time provides a good prediction of ex-ante real interest
rates, so that we can write
rt = βXt−1 + ut (9)
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If we combine Equations (7) to (9) we arrive at the final regression equation
eprrt = βXt−1 + ut − εt (10)
where εt = πt − πet . Rational expectations imply that this equation can be estimated




), although we do not apply this transformation to the nominal rate. To
make the series comparable to the interest rates, we multiply the yearly changes by 100.
In the estimation, we employ lags of different length of the nominal monthly money rate,
money supply and inflation.13
Table 2: Our replication of Voth’s model 2 for the period until December 1930
Dependent variable: monthly money
Variable Coefficient std. Error t
i(−1) 0.820 0.085 9.69
π(−1) -1.193 0.038 -31.25
π(−4) 0.271 0.037 7.22
m(−1) -0.017 0.044 -0.38
m(−8) -.024 0.049 -0.51




13 We chose the following series as stated in Wagemann (1935): Monthly money rate: p.112 ‘15.
Monatsgeld’. Money supply: p.130, ‘1. Geldumlauf insgesamt, Stand Monatsende’. Inflation (of
industrial finished products): p.114 , ‘23. Industrielle Fertigwaren insgesamt’.
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We estimate the following equation over the period 05/1926 to 12/1930 and then add
recursively month by month until September 1935.
eprrt = β0C + β1it−1 + β2πt−1 + β3πt−4 + β4mt−1 + β4mt−8 + εt (11)
Our estimates, which we depict in Table 2, comes close to Voth’s own estimation results
for the first estimation period until December 1930.
Figure 7: Expected and actual inflation
Notes: Actual inflation on an annual basis from prices for industrial finished products. Ex-
pected inflation computed from plugging our real rate forecasts into the Fisher equation.
In Figure 7, we plot annual inflation and the series of inflation expectations computed
from plugging our real rate forecasts into the Fisher equation. Our estimated inflation
series moves closely with the realized inflation with the exception of the period between
July and September 1931 during the German banking crisis. As in our FAVAR forecasts,
we find no shift to inflation expectations at the start of the recovery around mid-1932.
Inflation expectations start increasing in the second half of 1932 but only turn positive
by late 1933. Voth’s application of the Mishkin approach to German data therefore
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seems to underscore our own results. There were no inflation expectations at the start
of the recovery from the Great Depression. Further, Voth (1999) provides a possible
explanation for the increasing inflation expectations indicated by our FAVAR forecasts
in 1932. The inflation forecasts, particularly over a long time horizon, of close to zero
percent could reflect the high uncertainty about future price developments during this
period.
A.2 Price cuts under the presidential decree of December, 1931
The source for the drastic fall of prices in January 1932 indicated by our own time series
evidence was due to one policy measure: the concerted and official reductions of prices,
rents, wages and interest rates by the presidential decree of December 8, 1931. Since the
timing and the expectations of the measure are important for our reasoning, we provide
a detailed description leaning on news articles and the official legislative texts stated in
the law gazette of the Reich (‘Reichsgesetzblatt’ = RGB).
The decree (‘Vierte Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft
und Finanzen und zum Schutze des inneren Friedens’ ) stated that fixed prices had to
be reduced by at least ten percent by January 1, 1932 compared to the prices on June
30, 1931. As fixed prices, the law defined prices of products for which prices where set
by contractual agreements such as cartels or syndicates. The industries for which this
was the case were iron and metal, construction, chemicals, paper, glassware, ceramics
and textiles, as well as coal (RGB 1931, Nr. 79, 1. Teil, Kap. 1.1 §1(2) and §3).
The reductions were complemented by a commissioner for price control for which a
second decree was issued on December 8. His task was to enforce the consumer price
reductions and punish violations (see ‘Verordnung über die Befugnisse des Reichskom-
missars für Preisüberwachung’, RGB 1931, Nr. 80).
The price reductions were accompanied by reductions of rents by ten percent and
37
of wages by up to fifteen percent. The presidential decree also contained a section on
interest rates. The nominal rates on a large number of bonds, obligations and debt
instruments were reduced by a proportionate share between zero and up to 50 percent
(see RGB 1931, Nr. 79, parts 1-3). To support the intended effects of the presidential
decrees, the Reichsbank reduced the discount and Lombard rates on December 10, 1931.
The news media covered the presidential decree and its consequences in detail after
the decree became published. Before its passage, exact measures were unknown. First
mention of possible future price and wage cuts appeared on December 3. Nevertheless,
on December 8, VZ reported of an ‘emergency decree with surprises’, as the decree
had become the subject of last minute changes. After December 8, the measures were
discussed in-depth and should thus be regarded as common knowledge in December 1932
and to take effect on January 1, 1932. The first price reductions in response to the decree
were mentioned on December 18 (see VZ, LA and other newspapers 01.11.31-31.01.32).
A.3 Prior distribution
We specify the following prior for the parameters in each equation i = 1, . . . , N of (1):















These values are taken from Ritschl and Sarferaz (2014). For the VAR block of the
model we set the natural conjugate Normal-Inverse Wishart prior as in Kadiyala and
Karlsson (1997)
Σ ∼ IW (S,K + 2)
vec(B)|Σ ∼ N (vec(B),Σ⊗G)
The matrix S is the K-dimensional identity matrix. The diagonal elements of G are




, where p = 0.05. The prior covariance matrix of the VAR parameters is given
by S ⊗ G. The posterior distributions are shown in Appendix A.4. B is the KL × K
matrix of prior VAR parameters, which has all zeros.
A.4 Estimation of the FAVAR model
We perform estimation using the following steps. First, we start with a sample that
ends in December of 1929 and estimate the factor model on standardized data up to
that point in time. After an initial burn-in period, we then estimate our forecasts for
one, six, and twelve months according to Equations (5) and (6). We then expand the
sample by one month and perform the sampler and regressions again. This is done until
December of 1934. One could in principle estimate the factor model over the entire
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sample once, but this creates the problem that when we sample the common factors the
algorithm moves backwards through the sample and draws the factors based on their
conditional distributions. This means that for each time period we use information that
economic agents would not have known yet. Our procedure, instead, makes use only of
available information when estimating the model.
For each run, we performed 50,000 iterations of the sampler, each time resetting the
prior covariances in the VAR to account for the changing information available. We
then discard the initial 30,000 draws and base the inference on the remaining draws.
Our point estimates are then the medians of the posterior distributions at each point in
time together with 95 % bands of the posterior probability mass. We use L = 12 in the
estimation and K = 3 common factors for each run.
We start by drawing the idiosyncratic variances conditional on the data, factors, and









where εi is the T×1 vector of residuals in equation i. Next, based on the drawn variances
we sample the factor loadings from















where f is T ×K and Yi is T × 1. To sample the VAR block, we write the VAR as
F = XB + U
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where F is the (T − L)×K matrix of common factors, X is the (T − L)×KL matrix
of the lagged common factors that has the first lags of all factors in the first K columns,
the second lags in the next K columns, and so on, and B is the KL × K matrix of
coefficients. We then draw the VAR covariance matrix and the coefficients from
Σ ∼ IW(S, T − L+K + 2)
vec(B) ∼ N (vec(B),Σ⊗G)














and variables with a hat denote OLS quantities.
Sampling the latent factors is based on the state space representation of the model. We
write this as
Yt = C +HFt + εt





B̃ denotes the companion form matrix of the VAR, and ṽt are the original errors in the
VAR, appended with zeros. To sample the common factors, we employ the Carter-Kohn
algorithm. We first use the Kalman-Filter to produce estimates of the state vectors and
then go backward in the sample; at each point we draw the common factors from the
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corresponding normal distribution. The exact procedure is nicely explained in Kim and
Nelson (1999).
A.5 Variables used to estimate the common factors
The following table lists all variables used to extract the common factors, together with
transformations performed prior to estimation.
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Variable Code SA Transformation
Production and Employment
Number of Uneymployed II.B.20 1 1
Number of Recipients of Unemployment Benefits II.B.21 1 1
Industrial Production III.B.11 1 1
Productiongoods III.B.12 1 1
Investmentgoods III.B.13 1 1
Consumptiongoods, elastic demand III.B.16 1 1
Consumptiongoods, inelastic demand III.B.17 1 1
Fuels III.B.18 1 1
Basic materials III.B.19 1 1
Constructions III.B.20 1 1
Iron III.B.22 1 1
Construction Industry total III.B.26 1 1
Coal III.B.31 1 1
Gas III.B.32 1 1
Electricity III.B.33 1 1
Oil III.B.35 1 1
Paper III.B.36 1 1
Potassium III.B.37 1 1
Textiles III.B.39 1 1
Shoes III.B.40 1 1
Household Porcelain III.B.42 1 1
Orders of machinery within Germany IV.4 1 1
Sales
Foods VI.A.2 1 1
Textiles and Clothing VI.A.3 1 1
Furniture and Household Appliances VI.A.4 1 1
Grocery stores VI.A.7 1 1
Rural grocery stores VI.A.8 1 1
Drugstores VI.A.12 1 1
Men clothing VI.A.14 1 1
Women clothing VI.A.15 1 1
Shoes VI.A.16 1 1
Furniture specialist shops VI.A.19 1 1
Colonial products, central retailer cooperative VI.B.25 1 1
Colonial products, local retailer cooperative VI.B.26 1 1
Drugs, retailer cooperative VI.B.27 1 1
Furniture, retailer cooperative VI.B.28 1 1
Clocks, retailer cooperative VI.B.29 1 1
Innkeeping, retailer cooperative VI.B.30 1 1
Bakeries, central retailer cooperative VI.B.31 1 1
Bakeries, local retailer cooperative VI.B.32 1 1
Butchers, retailer cooperative VI.B.33 1 1
Cutters, retailer cooperative VI.B.34 1 1
Shoemakers, retailer cooperative VI.B.35 1 1
Saddlers, retailer cooperative VI.B.36 1 1
Painter, retailer cooperative VI.B.37 1 1
Woodworking, retailer cooperative VI.B.38 1 1
Metalworking, retailer cooperative VI.B.39 1 1
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Variable Code SA Transformation
Imports
Foods and Drinks VII.B.a.5 1 2
Raw materials and semi-finished products VII.B.a.6 1 2
Finished products VII.B.a.7 1 2
Exports
Foods and Drinks VII.C.a.13 1 2
Raw materials and semi-finished products VII.C.a.14 1 2
Finished products VII.C.a.15 1 2
Prices
Agricultural products IX.B.3 1 1
Herbal foods IX.B.4 1 1
Animals for slaughter IX.B.5 1 1
Cattel products IX.B.6 1 1
Animal feed IX.B.7 1 1
Colonial products IX.B.8 1 1
Industrial raw materials and semi-finished products IX.B.9 1 1
Coal IX.B.10 1 1
Iron IX.B.11 1 1
Metal IX.B.12 1 1
Textiles IX.B.13 1 1
Leather IX.B.14 1 1
Chemicals IX.B.15 1 1
Artifical fertilizers IX.B.16 1 1
Power oils and lubricants IX.B.17 1 1
Rubber IX.B.18 1 1
Paper IX.B.19 1 1
Building materials IX.B.20 1 1
Basic materials IX.B.21 1 1
Industrial raw materials for exports IX.B.22 1 1
Industrial finished goods IX.B.23 1 1
Means of production IX.B.24 1 1
Agricultural dead inventory IX.B.25 1 1
Agricultural machinery IX.B.26 1 1
Commercial facilities IX.B.27 1 1
Commercial machinery IX.B.28 1 1
Crafting materials IX.B.29 1 1
Consumptiongoods IX.B.30 1 1
Furniture IX.B.31 1 1
Clothing and Shoes IX.B.33 1 1
Nutrition IX.C.36 1 1
Heating and Lighting IX.C.38 1 1
Clothing for households IX.C.39 1 1
Other IX.C.40 1 1
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Variable Code SA Transformation
Nominal Interest Rates
Reichsbank discount rate X.A.a.1 0 0
Reichsbank lombard rate X.A.a.2 0 0
Creditcosts X.A.b.5 0 0
Daily due money X.A.b.8 0 0
Daily money X.A.c.14 0 0
Monthly deposits X.A.c.15 0 0
Private discount rate X.A.c.16 0 0
Goods of Exchange X.A.c.17 0 0
Money and Banking
Circulation of money XIII.b.5 1 2
Circulation of notes (Reichsbank and private) XIII.b.6 1 2
Circulation of Rentenbank notes XIII.b.7 1 2
Circulation of coins XIII.b.8 1 2
Billing traffic by the Reichsbank XIII.c.9 1 2
Giro traffic by the Reichsbank XIII.c.10 1 2
Post check traffic XIII.c.12 1 2
Credit on post check accounts XIII.c.13 1 2
Drawings of bills XIII.c.16 1 2
Circulation of bills of exchange XIV.A.3 1 2
Stock of gold and currency, Reichsbank XIV.B.5 1 2
Investments, Reichsbank XIV.B.6 1 2
Exchange loans, Reichsbank XIV.B.7 1 2
Deposits, Reichsbank XIV.B.8 1 2
Table 3: Variables used to estimate the common factors. ’Code’ refers to the numeric
codes from Wagemann (1935). ’SA’ denotes whether series was seasonally adjusted (1)
or not (0). ’Transformation’ denotes whether a series entered in levels (0), transformed
into 100 times first differences of logs (1), or converted into real terms using the cost of
living index and then transformed into 100 times first differences of logs (2).
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